The chicken or the egg? A note on the dynamic interrelation between government bond spreads and credit default swaps by Delis, Manthos D & Mylonidis, Nikolaos
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The chicken or the egg? A note on the
dynamic interrelation between
government bond spreads and credit
default swaps
Manthos D Delis and Nikolaos Mylonidis
University of Ioannina
20. September 2010
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/25270/
MPRA Paper No. 25270, posted 22. September 2010 23:15 UTC
 1
 
 
The chicken or the egg? A note on the dynamic interrelation 
between government bond spreads and credit default swaps 
 
 
 
Manthos D. Delis*  
Department of Economics, University of Ioannina, University of Ioannina Campus, 
45110, Greece 
 
 
Nikolaos Mylonidis 
Department of Economics, University of Ioannina, University of Ioannina Campus, 
45110, Greece 
 
 
Abstract 
This note provides the first empirical assessment of the dynamic interrelation between 
government bond spreads and their associated credit default swaps (CDS). We use 
data for the Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that 
found themselves with a problematic public sector in the dawn of the recent financial 
distress. We find that CDS prices Granger-cause government bond spreads after the 
eruption of the 2007 subprime crisis. Feedback causality is detected during periods of 
financial and economic turmoil, thereby indicating that high risk aversion tends to 
perplex the transmission mechanism between CDS prices and government bond 
spreads.      
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1. Introduction 
The recent financial turmoil has taken a heavy toll on the global economy and 
has had a devastating effect on public finances. One of the issues that attracted the 
attention of policy makers and market participants is whether changes in sovereign 
bond yield differentials cause changes in the associated credit defaults swaps (CDS) 
or vice versa. This note provides first-hand evidence to answer this question.   
Our study is primarily motivated by the recent developments in the market for 
government securities. These securities were until recently considered to be virtually 
risk-free assets; clearly this is not the case anymore. Evidently, those countries that 
were already running a high public deficit and/or debt are agonizing to borrow money 
at low interest rates in the bond markets and to finance their debt without altering its 
structure. Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy are probably the best examples of this 
state of affairs. The difficulties faced by these countries led some (primarily policy 
makers but also academics) to blame hedge funds for speculative attacks on CDS. On 
this basis, in the late 2009 and early 2010, individual country governments, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank leveled a severe criticism on 
hedge funds and other financial institutions for speculative attacks on CDS.  
The academic debate on this issue is based on economic theories of maturity 
transformation (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983), herding behavior (Scharfstein and Stein, 
1990) and leverage cycles (Geanakoplos, 2009). These general mechanisms are 
thought to affect the CDS-bond linkages through short-term inefficiencies in the 
market. For example, any entity (private or public) that faces a maturity mismatch 
between its expected revenues and debt obligations, anticipates having to roll over its 
debt periodically. If investors are sufficiently pessimistic about its ability to refinance 
its debt, the entity (here the government) may face a run on its bonds and/or a buyout 
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of the underlying CDS. Also, as Geanakoplos (2009) notes, naked CDS1 contracts 
allow pessimists to leverage, which, in turn, increases the cost of borrowing and leads 
to further increases in the CDS (and the probability of insolvency). Both the 
Diamond-Dybvig and the Geneakoplos mechanisms can be exacerbated in periods of 
stress, when herding behavior of investors is a very common characteristic of the 
market.     
The empirical literature that investigates the CDS-bond nexus has mainly 
concentrated on the relationship between corporate bonds and their underlying CDS 
(see Longstaff et al., 2003; Blanco et al., 2005; Forte and Pena, 2009). These studies 
uniformly agree that corporate CDS prices lead bond prices in the price discovering 
process. The explanation is that when e.g. risk perceptions concerning corporate 
bonds rise, investors already holding these bonds want to insure against this 
adjustment and so demand for CDS increases. Subsequently, this translates into 
higher interest rates on bond prices for new purchases or new investors on the bonds. 
Yet, in times of heightened economic and financial uncertainty, short-term 
inefficiencies of the kind described in the theoretical papers above may prevail, 
thereby altering the direction of causality (i.e. from bonds to CDS). Thus, it would be 
interesting to examine whether this is in fact the case at specific periods of severe 
stress in the markets.  
Similar to existing empirical studies, in this note we examine the CDS-bond 
spreads linkages. Our analysis, however, possesses two main novelties. First, unlike 
the previous studies on corporate bonds, it uses data on 10-year government yield 
spreads (over a benchmark bond rate) and their underlying CDS, and focuses on the 
four Southern European countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) that have found 
                                                
1 This term refers to the taking out insurance on bonds without actually owing these bonds.  
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themselves on the cyclone’s eye over the last year. Second, it employs rolling Granger 
causality tests that, to the best of our knowledge, have not been used before to tackle 
the issue at hand. In particular, rolling analysis allows for the emergence of a clearer 
picture of the possible dynamic linkages between yield differentials and CDS prices 
since, although the sample size remains unchanged, the sample period moves ahead 
by one observation at a time. Therefore, the observed statistics at every stage provide 
a more thorough reflection of the sequence of events and allow detecting changes in 
the direction of causality over time.  
The main findings are as follows. In line with the corporate finance literature, 
the results show that CDS Granger-cause bond spreads after the eruption of the 
subprime crisis in 2007. Nevertheless, feedback causality is also detected at specific 
points in time that are more or less common in all four countries considered. Notably, 
there is evidence of feedback causality during relatively short time periods when 
markets seem to have internalized (i) the costs of the sub-prime crisis in 2008, and (ii) 
the increases in the public deficits that came as a result of the crisis in the late 2009 
and early 2010.     
The rest of the note is organized along the following lines. Section 2 describes 
the data used in this study. Section 3 presents and discusses the empirical results. 
Section 4 concludes the paper.  
        
2. Data  
 For the empirical analysis, we use daily data on 10-year government yield 
spreads (over the German Bund) for four euro area countries, namely Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. These spreads are matched with the corresponding 10-year euro-
denominated CDS mid bid-ask prices. Data are collected from Bloomberg at the close 
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of the European markets. The sample period for Greece and Italy runs from July 9, 
2004 to May 25, 2010 and excludes holidays. Due to data availability and missing 
observations, the sample period for Spain and Portugal starts somewhat later (January 
3, 2005 and July 13, 2006, respectively).  
The sample covers the post-euro era, and thus it is free from any exchange rate 
risk, as all issues are in euros. However, bond spreads are still affected by domestic 
risk factors (i.e. credit risk and differences in market liquidity) and the concomitant 
changes in investors’ preferences. Decomposing empirically credit and liquidity risk 
is cumbersome, since only the sum of these two components can be observed. A 
number of studies (Geyer et al., 2004; Pagano and von Thadden, 2004) indicate that 
liquidity differences have at best a minor role in the time series behaviour of the 
sovereign yield spreads in the euro area countries. On the contrary, yield differentials 
are mainly driven by the credit default component. Therefore, the use of information 
in the underlying CDS can be viewed as a high-frequency measure of the credit 
default component of the government yield spreads.2 This allows us to restrict our 
analysis in the bivariate case (spreads and CDS) and look for their dynamic 
interrelationship over time. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
Granger causality tests necessitate that all data series involved are stationary; 
otherwise the inference from the F-statistic might be spurious due to non-standard 
distributions. To test for stationarity, we first perform conventional ADF unit root 
tests. Since these tests assume no structural break in the series, we also apply the 
                                                
2 Although CDS may also be affected by other factors (such as liquidity), they are viewed as the best 
measure of credit risk available at high frequency (Longstaff et al., 2005). 
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Zivot-Andrews (1992) sequential test procedure for unit roots in which the breakpoint 
is estimated endogenously. The test results (not reported here but available from the 
authors on request) indicate that all series can be described as I(1) processes. 
Furthermore, the breakpoints, as identified by the Zivot-Andrews test, are statistically 
significant and vary across countries and estimated models.  
Since all variables are I(1), we also test for bilateral cointegration between 
government bond yield spreads and their corresponding CDS prices. Table 1 – Panel 
A reports the results of the cointegration tests using the Johansen (1988, 1991) 
procedure. The test results indicate the presence of a long-run relationship only in the 
case of Spanish spreads and their associated CDS prices. In all other instances, the 
maximum eigenvalue and trace test statistics are well below their 5% critical value. 
However, these tests do not account for endogenously determined structural changes. 
Therefore, we also use the Gregory and Hansen (1996) test for cointegration with a 
one shift in the cointegrating vector at some unknown date. These are residual-based 
tests for the null of no cointegration against three models of a regime shift, depending 
on whether the shift affects the intercept or the slope and whether a trend is included 
in the cointegrating regression. To test for cointegration with a structural change, 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) propose the use of three tests, which are modifications of 
the test statistics Za , Zt (suggested by Phillips, 1987) and ADF. For brevity, we only 
report the results from the level shift model (model 2 in Gregory and Hansen’s 
jargon). The test results are given in Table 1 – Panel B and almost uniformly reject 
the null of no cointegration, thereby suggesting the presence of a long-run relationship 
between government bond spreads and CDS prices.3   
                                                
3 Model 3 (level shift with trend) and Model 4 (regime shift) yield qualitatively similar results 
(available from the authors upon request).  
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In order to complete our preliminary analysis, Table 2 reports the results of 
standard Granger causality tests over the full sample period. These tests are conducted 
within a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with one cointegrating vector and 
no structural breaks. We find that, with the exception of Italy, spreads and CDS 
Granger-cause each other.4 For Italy, the results provide evidence of unidirectional 
causality from spreads to CDS.  
However, these findings are only indicative. The evidence reported in Table 1 
indicates the presence of multiple breakpoints, and thus the possibility of time-varying 
causality between the corresponding markets. This substantiates the use of rolling 
Granger causality tests, which explicitly allow for changes in the bilateral 
interrelationship. Therefore, we perform a series of rolling Granger regressions in first 
difference form with the inclusion of an error correction term to account for the 
presence of cointegration between CDS and bond spreads. The corresponding F-
statistics are calculated for a rolling 250-observations (approximately one calendar 
year) time window, by adding one observation to the end and removing the beginning 
observation. That is, starting with observations 1 to 250, the first F-statistic is 
calculated. Then, we calculate the F-statistics for observations 2 – 251, 3 – 252, etc. 
The sequences of these statistics (reported on the last day of the rolling sample period 
from which they are derived) are scaled by their 5% critical value. If the value of the 
scaled test statistic is above one, the null hypothesis of no Granger causality can be 
rejected at the 5% level for the specified sub-sample period. The plots of these rolling 
F-statistics are presented in Figures 1 to 4.  
 Evidently, for all four countries, CDS Granger-cause spreads from 2007 
onwards (see top graphs in all four figures). Quite interestingly, for those countries 
                                                
4 This finding is in line with previous evidence on corporate bonds (see e.g. Zhu, 2006). 
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that data are available (i.e. Greece, Spain and Italy), we find no evidence for such 
causality prior to 2007. These findings are noteworthy, as they show that causality 
running from CDS to spreads works as a leading indicator of market anxiety. 
Therefore, when anxiety is built in the financial markets, government bonds are no 
longer identified as risk-free assets, their underlying CDS rise and this increase is 
transmitted to the bond spreads. In this fashion, the market for government securities 
works identically to the market for corporate securities (see e.g. Longstaff et al., 
2003; Blanco et al., 2005; Forte and Pena, 2009).  
Nevertheless, this transmission mechanism from CDS to bond spreads is less 
than clear cut. The findings of reverse causality from spreads to CDS (indicating bi-
directional causality) at specific points in time are in our view even more interesting. 
In all countries considered, we identify an initial period where spreads also Granger-
cause CDS. The timing, duration and magnitude of this causality somewhat differ 
among countries. For example, Greek and Portuguese spreads seem to Granger cause 
CDS for almost a full calendar year (2008:01 – 2009:1 and 2007:07 – 2008:07, 
respectively), whereas in the cases of Spain and Italy the same causality holds for a 
much shorter period of time (2007:12-2008:01 and 2007:07 – 2007:09, respectively). 
However, a common characteristic among the findings for all countries is that these 
periods practically coincide with the aftermath of the subprime mortgage crisis in the 
USA and the associated increased volatility in the stock markets.5 Next, towards the 
end of 2008, early expectations were suggesting an exit from the crisis and conditions 
on government bond markets eased considerably. At this period, we observe that 
                                                
5 These findings are in line with the literature that shows that stock market fluctuations play an 
important role in determining the movements in the corporate bond and CDS prices (e.g. Forte and 
Pena, 2009). 
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causality from bond spreads to the underlying CDS diminishes to non-significant 
levels. However, government bond spreads in Greece, Portugal, and Spain (and to a 
lesser extent in Italy) started rising again sharply owing to fears concerning the public 
finances of these countries. Thus, the 2007 financial crisis was followed by a public 
debt crisis in the late 2009 - early 2010, during which spreads once again clearly 
Granger cause CDS.6   
We contend that these findings are primarily consistent with herding behavior 
of the large players of the market, as formed by rational expectations. In times of 
heightened financial and economic uncertainty, investors typically have a higher 
preference for less risky and more liquid securities. In principle, this should benefit all 
government bonds as these are typically regarded as less risky than other asset classes 
such as stocks and corporate bonds. In the dawn of the debt crisis, however, Southern 
European government bonds became risky, illiquid and their spreads to the German 
Bund (the safest haven in the Eurozone) skyrocketed. Therefore, in times of high risk 
aversion, the flight-to-safety to the German government bond market becomes more 
pronounced, thereby disrupting the transmission mechanism from CDS to bond 
spreads. In other words, under stressful conditions CDS lose their leading role in the 
price discovery process. Last, but not least, the finding of bi-directional causality 
during the financial and debt crises mitigates the common conception of speculative 
attacks on countries’ default. If that was the case, then we should have observed only 
unidirectional causality from CDS to bond spreads. Clearly more analysis is needed 
                                                
6 In the case of Spain, we also observe a third period (late 2008 – early 2009) where spreads Granger 
causes CDS. This may be associated with the significant and ongoing solvency problems of the 
Spanish banks.    
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on that front, involving the separation of herding behavior from speculative attacks 
and requiring data on the extent of naked CDS trading.            
 
4. Concluding remarks 
This paper examines for the first time the dynamic interrelation between 
government bond spreads and their underlying CDS prices. Using data on four 
Southern European countries and performing a series of rolling Granger-causality 
tests, we show that over the last five years CDS almost uniformly Granger-cause 
spreads. Feedback causality is, however, detected during times of intense financial 
and economic turbulences. This may indicate that high risk aversion tends to perplex 
the transmission mechanism between bond spreads and CDS prices. 
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Table 1. Cointegration test results: Full sample period 
Panel A: The Johansen procedure 
     Max.eigenvalue     Trace statistic  
Country Sample period  r=0      r=1  r=0            r≤1 
Greece  09.07.04 - 25.05.10 15.75  2.64  18.39            2.64 
Portugal 13.07.06 - 25.05.10 12.47  1.77  14.24            1.77 
Spain  03.01.05 - 25.05.10  39.95*  4.48  44.43*            4.48 
Italy  09.07.04 - 25.05.10   11.21  3.44  14.65            3.44 
 
Panel B: Gregory & Hansen procedure 
Country Test statistic  A  Breakpoint 
Greece ADF*    -3.93  08.11.2006 
  *aZ    -62.87* 12.27.2006 
  *tZ    -7.85*  02.20.2007 
Portugal ADF*   -4.47  11.08.2007 
  *aZ    -74.36* 01.02.2008 
  *tZ    -7.02*  01.02.2008 
Spain  ADF*   -5.75*  07.30.2009 
  *aZ    -154.34* 05.13.2009 
  *tZ    -11.46* 05.13.2009 
Italy  ADF*   -5.80*  03.02.2006 
  *aZ    -103.12* 02.24.2006  
  *tZ    -9.23*  05.02.2006 
Notes: The 5% critical values for the trace test (for r=0 and r≤1) are 20.26 and 9.16, 
respectively. The corresponding critical values for the maximal eigenvalue test (for r=0 and 
r=1) are 15.89 and 9.16. Critical values are provided by MacKinnon et al. (1999). Both tests 
assume an intercept (but no trend) in the cointegrating equation and no intercept in the VAR. 
The optimal lag length of the VAR is chosen on the basis of Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC). The 5% critical values for ADF*, *aZ  and 
*
tZ are -4.61, -40.48 and -4.61, 
respectively (see Table 1 in Gregory and Hansen (1996)). The breakpoints are reported 
as mm.dd.year. * indicates rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level. 
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Table 2. Tests of Granger causality: Full sample period 
Country  Unidirectional  Reverse  Outcome 
   CDS → Spreads Spreads → CDS  
Greece   28.73*   19.93*   Feedback 
Portugal  67.02*   65.57*   Feedback 
Spain   347.23*  246.08*  Feedback  
Italy    0.040   14.90*   Spreads → CDS 
Notes: Granger causality tests are performed within a bivariate (spreads and CDS prices) 
VECM. The optimal lag length is chosen on the basis of Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SIC). Granger causality is examined by testing whether all coefficients of the independent 
variable are equal to zero using a standard F-test. CDS → Spreads stands for CDS cause 
Spreads, whereas Spreads → CDS stands for Spreads cause CDS. * indicates rejection of the 
null hypothesis (no Granger causality) at the 5% level.  
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Figure 1. Greece: Normalized Rolling Granger Causality Tests 
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Notes: Rolling Granger causality tests are performed within a bivariate (spreads and CDS 
prices) VECM. The optimal lag length of the rolling Granger causality tests is selected on the 
basis of Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) for the full sample period and is set equal to 5. 
The vertical axis shows the F-statistics scaled by the 5% critical value. Values greater than 1 
indicate Granger causality at the 5% significance level. 
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Figure 2. Portugal: Normalized Rolling Granger Causality Tests 
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Notes: Rolling Granger causality tests are performed within a bivariate (spreads and CDS 
prices) VECM. The optimal lag length of the rolling Granger causality tests is selected on the 
basis of Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) for the full sample period and is set equal to 5. 
The vertical axis shows the F-statistics scaled by the 5% critical value. Values greater than 1 
indicate Granger causality at the 5% significance level. 
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Figure 3. Spain: Normalized Rolling Granger Causality Tests 
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Notes: Rolling Granger causality tests are performed within a bivariate (spreads and CDS 
prices) VECM. The optimal lag length of the rolling Granger causality tests is selected on the 
basis of Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) for the full sample period and is set equal to 7. 
The vertical axis shows the F-statistics scaled by the 5% critical value. Values greater than 1 
indicate Granger causality at the 5% significance level. 
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Figure 4. Italy: Normalized Rolling Granger Causality Tests 
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Notes: Rolling Granger causality tests are performed within a bivariate (spreads and CDS 
prices) VECM. The optimal lag length of the rolling Granger causality tests is selected on the 
basis of Schwarz Information Criterion (SIC) for the full sample period and is set equal to 1. 
The vertical axis shows the F-statistics scaled by the 5% critical value. Values greater than 1 
indicate Granger causality at the 5% significance level. 
 
